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AUTHORITY

AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (7 Sep 67) FOR OT RD-670261✓

19 September 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th  
Battalion, 13th Artillery

~~Classified as SECRET~~

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*WASH ID E-20310*

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery for quarterly period ending 30 April 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

1 Incl  
as

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HEADQUARTERS  
7TH BATTALION, 13TH ARTILLERY  
APO 96238

AVFA-AT-7/13-S3

30 April 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

## SECTION 1 (U) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

### 1.(U) General

This battalion during the past quarter has supported a variety of operations and missions. Operations supported were Thayer II and Pershing. Other missions supported were Highway 19 security and artillery support for Binh Dinh Self Defense Area. Support was rendered to 1st Air Cavalry Division, 4th Infantry Division and Capitol ROK Infantry Division at various times during the reporting period.

### 2.(U) Intelligence

7th Battalion 13th Artillery is dependent upon other agencies for target acquisition and collection of intelligence. The lack of organic aircraft and the lack of suitable missions for forward observer teams are the two major contributing factors that cause this unit to be dependent upon other sources.

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### 3.(U) Operations and Training

a. The battalion remained attached to IFFV Arty until 28 April, at which time it was attached to the 41st Arty Group. The mission of General Support of U.S., ARVN, and Free World Military Forces has not been changed. The major portion of the effort has been in support of the 1st Air Cavalry Division in Operations Thayer II and Pershing. During this quarter the firing batteries had the following number of days in Base Camp: Battery A - six days, Battery B - one day, Battery C - seven days.

b. Training in depth has received considerable emphasis during this quarter. Because of normal attrition, combat losses, and the personnel infusion program, it has been imperative that each member of any section within the battalion be trained to accomplish the duties of other members of the section. The lowest numbered cannoneer must be qualified and prepared to assume the position of gunner on a moments notice. Continual emphasis has been and must continue to be placed in this area.

c. While continuing to support combat operations, the Headquarters and Service Battery elements, with minimum assistance from the firing batteries, have dismantled and moved battalion base camp two times during the quarter. In the first move this involved dismantling some 87 WAETOC units and moving the lumber to a new location for reconstruction.

d. This battalion, and the 1/9 Cavalry Squadron, which has no organic artillery support, has teamed up to conduct four artillery raids in the Pershing AO. The purpose of these raids is to extend the arm of the artillery and let the enemy know that he is never safe from its knockout punch. Each raid is planned for a one day period with the idea of assaulting by air, delivering a maximum number of rounds on both preplanned targets and will adjust missions, and extracting before the enemy has time to react. The 1/9 Cavalry Squadron furnishes security and reconnaissance while this battalion furnishes the firepower.

e. The following is a chronological sequence of major events during the quarter to include the posture of the battalion at the beginning and end of the quarter:

1 Feb 67 - Hqs and Btry A 7/13 Arty OPCON 1st Cav Div at LZ Hammond with a mission of GS

Btry B 7/13 Arty attached 3/6 Arty with a mission of Highway 19 security

3.

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Btry C, 7/13 Arty attached 1/30 Arty with a mission of GSR GRID

Btry C 1/30 Arty attached 7/13 Arty with a mission of GSR 1/77 Arty

6 Feb 67 - Btry A 7/13 Arty and Btry C 7/13 Arty exchanged missions and positions

8 Feb 67 - Battalion was notified of a possible move of base camp from LZ Hammond to Phu Cat Air Force Base

14 Feb 67 - Btry A, 7/13 Arty and Btry C, 1/30 Arty each returned to parent unit control, remaining in position and retaining the same missions.

Btry C and a Battalion Tactical Operations Center moved to LZ Two Bits to support the 1st Air Cavalry Division in Operation Pershing.

15 Feb 67 - Movement and de - construction of Base Camp commenced.

18 Feb 67 - Base Camp completed move from LZ Hammond to Phu Cat AFB

21 Feb 67 - Btry C (4 tubes) 7/13 Arty attached to 2/9 Arty and airlifted into LZ Corral. Two tubes remained at LZ Two Bits and were controlled by the battalion FDC.

26 Feb 67 - 4/60 Arty, which was sponsored by this battalion, arrived in-country

2 Mar 67 - Btry C (-) 7/13 Arty returned to LZ Two Bits by CH-47

18 Mar 67 - Btry B 7/13 Arty returned to parent unit and moved to Phu Cat AFB for one day of maintenance, medical, and personnel processing.

20 Mar 67 - Btry B 7/13 Arty OPCON 1st Cav Div (AM) moved by road to LZ English with a mission of GS and battalion control was assumed at LZ Two Bits

26 Mar 67 - Btry B 7/13 Arty moved to LZ Tom by road, with a mission of GSR 2/19 Arty

1 Apr 67 - Battalion received notification of the possible move of base camp from Phu Cat AFB to Camp Townes, existing base camp of 1st Bn 30th Arty and IFFORCEV Arty (Fwd)

3 Apr 67 - Btry A 7/13 Arty OPCON 1st Cav Div (AM) and moved to LZ Two Bits by road with a mission of GS



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- 6 Apr 67 - Movement of Base Camp from Phu Cat AFB to Camp Townes initiated.
- 10 Apr 67 - Btry C 6/32 Arty attached to 7/13 Arty and moved to LZ English on 11 April with a mission of GS 1st Cav Div.
- 12 Apr 67 - Btry C 7/13 Arty airlifted four tubes to LZ Irma for Arty raid.
- 14 Apr 67 - Base Camp completed move from Phu Cat AFB to Camp Townes.  
Btry C 7/13 Arty airlifted into LZ Sandra for an Arty raid.
- 17 Apr 67 - Btry C 7/13 Arty airlifted into LZ Putter for an Arty raid.
- 27 Apr 67 - Btry C 7/13 Arty airlifted into LZ Cannister for an Arty raid.
- 28 Apr 67 - Battalion detached from IFFV Arty and attached to 41st Arty Group.
- 29 Apr 67 - Btry C 6/32 Arty detached from this battalion.

f. The battalion FDC conducts first round chart data checks on all missions fired by organic batteries and attached batteries. This check has proven beneficial for the following reasons:

- (1) Detects errors on initial chart data
- (2) Maintains proficiency in battalion FDC
- (3) Maintains a more alert posture in the firing batteries by virtue of a check by another FDC.

g. The organic batteries of this battalion have fired a total of 60,028 rounds during the reporting period. The known results of all missions fired are as follows: 34 VC KIA (body count), 9 NVA KIA (body count), 37 huts destroyed, 32 huts damaged and 5 bunkers destroyed.

h. The following is an approximate breakdown of missions fired since 1 Feb 67:

| <u>TYPE MISSION</u> | <u>PERCENTAGE</u> |
|---------------------|-------------------|
| H&I                 | 87.8%             |
| Neutralization      | .8%               |

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|                |      |
|----------------|------|
| Defensive Tgts | 6.7% |
| Registrations  | 2.6% |
| Illumination   | .2%  |
| Preparations   | .8%  |
| TOT's          | 1.1% |

### 4.(U) Logistics

During the first fourteen days of February, Class I, III, and V supplies were drawn from Task Force HRNCIR at LZ Hammond. Class II and IV supplies were requisitioned and drawn from the Qui Nhon Support Command Depot. When Task Force HRNCIR ceased operations at LZ Hammond all classes of supply were drawn from the Qui Nhon Support Command. This arrangement was not entirely satisfactory because of the distance involved (fifteen miles one way) and poor road conditions. This was particularly true of drawing rations where there was always a tremendous waiting line. Class I supplies were once again drawn from LZ Hammond on 24 March when the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) established a Forward Support Element at that element. Those elements that have remained in support of and located in the vicinity of the 1st Cav Div (AM) have drawn Class I, III and V supplies from the Division Forward Support Element. Accounts have been established with the Forward Support Element for Classes II and IV and limited quantities of these supplies are drawn to meet immediate demands, however, the normal channel for these classes remaining through the Qui Nhon Support Command Depot.

### 5.(U) Personnel

This battalion, as well as all units arriving in Vietnam, faces a large rotational hump. USARV recognizes this fact and authorizes a system of curtailments and extensions that assist in spreading the hump. This battalion spread all of its DEROS's over a 75 day period based on this authorization. In February this prerogative was denied and all DEROS's for personnel in these categories were readjusted. The solution at that time was a program of infusion to assist in spreading the hump. Of the 393 enlisted personnel in the rotation hump 46 have voluntarily extended and 227 are slated for infusion. To date approximately 60 enlisted personnel have been infused and in almost all cases were replaced with men of lesser rank and experience. In May the authority was granted once again to curtail personnel, however this battalion will curtail only in special cases to avoid penalizing those personnel who voluntarily extended to avoid leaving the battalion in the infusion program.

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## SECTION 2 (U) COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Part I, Observations

#### 1. Personnel

##### a. Item: Casualty Assessment

Discussion: When accidents, incidents or attacks by enemy elements occur there is a certain amount of confusion involved. The majority of enemy initiated incidents as well as accidents involving artillery units occur during the hours of darkness.

Observation: This battalion has developed an SOP prescribing procedures for conducting musters, particularly during the hours of darkness. This SOP has eliminated much of the confusion during incidents and facilitated the detection of casualties.

##### b. Item: Processing Replacements

Discussion: Individual replacements should be processed as quickly as possible in the base camp area and sent to the batteries. Processing centers around personnel records, finance, with emphasis on savings and allotments, TA 50-901 equipment and medical orientation. The battery commander should be furnished a copy of each individual's Form 20 so that the commander has the necessary facts upon which to base the individual's assignment.

Observation: This battalion has developed a checklist to insure that each replacement has all of the necessary in-processing accomplished prior to being sent to the battery.

##### c. Item: Administrative Packet

Discussion: Artillery batteries operate up to 90 days away from base camp or the forward battalion CP. There are few opportunities for routine administration except by courier service. Available transportation generally precludes frequent visits by any or all members of the staff.

Observation: Batteries must be issued a packet of forms in sufficient quantity to meet anticipated requirements for 90 days. Casualty tags, Article 15 forms, Savings Deposit slips and DA Form 1049 are examples of forms that should be included in the packet. Units separated from the parent battalion should be augmented with a RTT capability, whenever possible, to assist in the handling of administrative matters. Frequent courier runs are desirable in lieu of direct communication.

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### d. Item: Rotation Hump

Discussion: Units that deploy to Vietnam have the problem of a rotation hump since the majority of the personnel will have the same DEROS.

Observation: To reduce the rotational hump the following courses of action should be considered:

- (1) Exchange of personnel between units within the major organization.
- (2) Encourage voluntary extension
- (3) Curtail overseas tours up to 45 days

The actions cited above should be taken immediately upon arrival in-country, and once approved, it should not be changed as a result of a new interpretation of the regulation under which the action was taken.

### 2. Operations

#### a. Item: Test firing of countermortar plans

Discussion: Btry B of this battalion while testing its ground defense plan fired rounds on a properly cleared target that resulted in the death of a Montagnard villager. These rounds were fired approximately 20 minutes after curfew. Although the establishment of a curfew for villagers and the clearing of fires with district authorities are accomplished for the protection of village personnel the possibility of these personnel strictly adhering to a curfew is unlikely.

Observation: Whenever possible, test missions in the vicinity of populated areas should be delayed until several hours after the curfew to decrease the possibility of friendlies being in the target area.

#### b. Item: Battery Sheaf

Discussion: During all moves, especially moves by airlift, and in the normal firing of tubes, there is a possibility that howitzer fire control equipment may become damaged and the damage not detected in the normal howitzer checks. This damage could result in rounds impacting in an area other than the desired area.

Observation: Immediately following all registrations have the observer observe a battery right by piece to check the sheaf. In addition to checking for undetected damage the effectiveness of the sheaf may be determined and personnel malpractices may be detected and corrected on the spot.

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### c. Item: Conservation of Plotting Sheets

Discussion: Because of the dust problem in most areas of RVN during certain seasons of the year, grid sheets must be cleaned several times each day and this constant cleaning will erase the grid lines.

Observation: Plotting sheet, polyethylene FSN: 7530-656-0813 can be used turned upside down. In doing this the chart may be cleaned with no loss of grid lines, thus extending the life of the grid sheet by two or three times.

### d. Item: Test Firing of individual and crew served weapons

Discussion: Many units that are not directly involved in contact with the enemy have a tendency to forget the importance of the individual and crew served weapons. The results of this action can be a loss of confidence in the weapon by the individual and a malfunction of the weapon when it is needed.

Observation: This battalion attempts to have all elements test fire all weapons at least once each month and more frequent, if possible eliminating to a large extent some of the problems mentioned above. One of the most common malfunctions has been found in the ammunition magazines.

### e. Item: Grid Sheet for 6400 mil capability

Discussion: The present grid sheets, FSN: 7530-656-0813 are too small for a maximum range capability for 6400 mils. In order to obtain maximum range, it is necessary to piece together two grid sheets. This solution results in an unnecessary loss of accuracy. The practice of superimposing grids on a single chart is not an acceptable solution because it makes a more complicated chart and increases the possibility of an error.

Observation: A grid sheet should be made available within the supply system that can be used for maximum range for 6400 mils. A separate chart should be available for light, medium and heavy artillery.

### f. Item: Computation and posting of MQE's

Discussion: A Battery within the battalion while firing their normal H&I program had a round strike a tree approximately 24 meters in front of the tube and detonate. Fragmentation from the round wounded 8 U.S. personnel, three of which were seriously wounded. The cause of this accident was a miscalculation of MQE for the second quadrant (1600-3200). The tree in question was on an azimuth of approximately 1600 but the fact that branches of the tree extended into the second quadrant was ignored when computing MQE for that quadrant.

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**Observation:** A procedure must be established within each firing battery for definitive checks of MQE's to include measuring of site to mask in all positions. MQE's must be prominently posted in FDC and kept on hand at all firing sections.

### g. Item: First Round Data Checks

**Discussion:** This battalion FDC conducts a first round chart data check on all missions fired by units organic to and attached to the battalion. The purpose in making these checks is to reduce the possibility of any computation errors in the first round data. Once the system is established, the data check can be accomplished in 10-15 seconds, consequently, causing a minimum of delay in any mission. The first round data check, in addition to detecting errors, serves the following useful purposes:

(1) Maintains proficiency in the battalion FDC

(2) Maintains a more alert posture in the battery FDC's by virtue of a check by another FDC.

**Observation:** The errors detected by the battalion FDC have not been numerous nor have they been large errors. The fact remains that it takes only one error, and in many cases a small error, to kill or injure friendly troops or civilians.

### h. Item: ASR for 105mm howitzer battalion in a GS role

**Discussion:** This battalion has had one or more batteries under the operational control of a Divisional Artillery during the entire quarter. As a rule the batteries reinforce one of the DS battalions. At times the batteries will assume a DS role for an element of the division. Ammunition expenditures for these batteries have approximated those of a DS battery.

**Observation:** During the past quarter the average HE expenditure for this battalion has been 28 rounds per tube per day. The average allocation during the same period has been 18 rounds per tube per day.

### i. Item: Assignment and use of admin and log net

**Discussion:** Because of the large area separating the firing batteries from the battalion headquarters, normal administration matters must be done by radio. This traffic does not have a place on either the fire nets nor the command net. Normally these nets are overloaded with other matters.

**Observation:** This battalion has requested and received a frequency for use as an admin and log net. This net has reduced considerably the traffic on both the command and fire nets.

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### j. Item: Assignment of missions

Discussion: During the past quarter this battalion has had batteries on missions that have little activity and tend to develop a sense of complacency within the battery. This is particularly true when the battery is operating in an independent role. A battery with a mission such as highway security has a tendency to slip away from good operating procedures and become immobile.

Observation: This battalion has attempted to rotate such missions at least once each month when possible. A battery that has been on such a mission for an extended period of time requires about a two week shakedown period.

### k. Item: Safety procedures in firing illumination

Discussion: Experience in Vietnam has shown that there are twelve pieces of metal ejected from the base of an illuminating shell in addition to the parachute and illuminating flare. These pieces of metal are of sufficient size and weight to seriously injure personnel. In one instance, a soldier suffered a serious head injury from this debris.

Observation: When firing illumination, a rectangular area, 400 meters in width extending in depth from the point of illumination to the point of shell casing impact, should be considered as not troop safe. This rule should be adhered to until more definitive data can be obtained from Fort Sill.

### 1. Item: Utilization of Forward Observers

Discussion: Artillery units with a GS mission have very few opportunities to employ forward observers in a normal observer role i.e. with a U.S. Infantry Company. Normal missions fall more in the category of liaison. This liaison may be with U.S. Forces or with other Free World Military Forces. Occasionally an opportunity is afforded to commit FO's with U.S. Infantry. As a consequence of this type utilization, Forward Observer teams miss out on a lot of invaluable experience and, on the other hand, are not properly trained to perform the missions assigned.

Observation: GS Forward Observer teams should be qualified in both observation and in liaison. Units should utilize any opportunity to employ FO teams with U.S. Infantry maneuver units.

### 3.(U) Logistics

a. Item: The WAETOC package authorizes such items as 70 cubic foot refrigerators, freezers, and ice making machines. 10 KW generators are issued as power sources. This battalion did not receive the generators with its WAETOC kit. Special Services items such as a 16mm movie projector, radio, and television sets have been issued in Vietnam. The majority of these electrical items have been on hand for 5 months and have not been used because of a lack of sufficient generators.

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Observation: Prior to deployment unit S-4's should determine the status of WABTOC kits to include a determination of whether or not they are complete. If they are not complete, higher headquarters should be made aware of the shortages to preclude having useful items on hand in a storage configuration.

b. Item: Requirements for TA 50-901

Discussion: Since arriving in Vietnam this battalions strength has increased by approximately 30%. These newly assigned personnel have come directly from CONUS without TA 50-901 equipment. In addition to this increase, personnel are being transferred out of the battalion in the infusion program with TA 50-901 and replacements are arriving from CONUS without equipment. This has caused, at times, critical shortages of TA 50-901 items needed for individual protection. Requisitions have been submitted with as much lead time as possible, but items are not always available for immediate issue.

Observation: Prior to deployment from CONUS, units should obtain a minimum of 20% overage of TA 50-901 items. Upon arrival in country, this 20% overage should be maintained to preclude critical shortages.

#### 4.(U) Communications

a. Item: Antenna for AN/GRC 46

Discussion: Initial communications may be established by the AN/GRC utilizing the whip antenna. However, the chance of maintaining these communications is not very good.

Observation: The use of the doublet with the AN/GRC 46 will increase the reliability of communications considerably.

b. Item: Personnel on Advance Party

Discussion: This battalion sponsored one unit that did not bring the Commo Officer in the advance party. Upon arrival of the main body numerous communication problems prevailed that could have been avoided had the Communications Officer accompanied the advance party. One of the major problems encountered was the inability to establish accounts without the Communication Officer.

Observation: The Communication Officer should definitely accompany the advance party.

c. Item: MWO's for the AN/GRC 46

Discussion: If at all possible, MWO's for the AN/GRC 46 radio should be applied prior to deployment. These MWO's are difficult to obtain in Vietnam. The RED BALL sometimes takes as long as six weeks and never less than three weeks. Examples of these modifications are:



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- (1) Installation Kit, Speed Security
- (2) 100 Amp Kit
- (3) Modification of AN/GRC 46 to accept the KW-7

Observation: All units should make maximum effort to obtain the above MWO's prior to deployment.

### 5.(U) Other

- a. Item: In-processing and inspection of firing batteries

Discussion: Firing batteries will periodically, after extended periods in the field, return to base camp for short periods of rehabilitation. These periods will seldom exceed 72 hours but are valuable because they afford the battalion commander an opportunity to take steps to insure a continued high state of combat efficiency.

Observation: A checklist or SOP will insure an established procedure to expedite rehabilitation of the batteries. Inclosure one is a copy of this battalions SOP for rehabilitating units.

- b. Item: Location of Base Camp

Discussion: Since arriving in Vietnam in October 1966, this battalion has been required to establish three separate base camps. On each occasion approval was given to construct WABTOC's and plan for permanent occupancy. These preparations included pouring concrete pads for mess halls. Each move has required approximately 300 vehicle loads and 5,800 man hours of labor to accomplish tearing down and moving.

Observation: This constant moving of base camp has distracted somewhat from the accomplishment of operational missions.

### Part II Recommendations

#### 1. Personnel

Once a unit has arrived in Vietnam, a procedure should be established to assist in spreading the rotation hump. Once this procedure is adopted it should not be subject to change. This procedure should be defined and action initiated within thirty days after arrival in country.

#### 2. Operations

A single grid sheet should be made available large enough to handle maximum range for 6400 mils. A separate sheet should be available for light, medium and heavy artillery.

#### 3. Logistics

ASR should be increased and a figure authorized that is more in line with expected expenditures.


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**5. Other**

A decision should be made prior to the arrival of a unit in Vietnam on the location of the base camp. All factors should be considered prior to the final selection of base camp location to avoid the problem of continuous relocation.

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as

  
DONALD J. MAJORS  
LTJ Arty  
Commanding

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AVFA-AT-41 (S-3) (30 Apr 67) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report For Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

HEADQUARTERS, 41ST ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96238, 15 May 1967

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, ATTN: S-3,  
APO 96350

In compliance with USARV 1-3, dated 23 March 1967, the Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Period 1 February - 30 April from the 7th Bn, 13th Arty is approved and forwarded.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



DONALD L. BURTON  
MAJ, Artillery  
Adjutant

1 Incl  
as

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AVFA-AT-D (30 Apr 67)

2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period  
Ending 30 April 1967, (RCS CSFOR-65) (7th Bn, 13th Arty) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96350 23 May 1967

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-CC-O&T, APO 96350


1. Concur in observations and recommendations contained in the basic communication.

2. The following additional comments are submitted.

a. Reference Section 2, Part I, para 3a: Generators required for power source are requested through the area engineer on DA Form 2701 (work order). USARV established this system upon realization that WAHTOC packages were shipped short of generators and to preclude unit use of TOE equipment for base camp operation. This item was brought to the attention of all attached units in the May I FFORCEV Arty Newsletter.

b. Reference Section 2, Part I, para 3b: In-country replacement of personnel, in the infusion program, transfer between units with TA 50-901. CONUS replacements do not have TA 50-901 items. Authorization to stock overage up to 25% can be made with the supporting DSU.

c. Reference Section 2, Part II, para 3: ASR established by USARV exceed the units announced expenditure on round/tube/day. The ASR indicated by the unit is the I FFORCEV intermediate control for ammunition items on the controlled list.

  
LEO E. ELLIS  
LTC, Arty  
Adjutant

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AVFA-GC-OT (30 Apr 67) 3d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period  
Ending 30 April 1967 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO 96307

1. This headquarters has reviewed the contents of the 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery operational report for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1967, and the preceding indorsements with the following comments.

2. Reference Section II, Part II - Recommendations: Concur.


a. Paragraph 1 - Personnel: Provisions have been instituted to assist new units upon arrival in-country to spread the rotational humps. There are several means by which this infusion program is accomplished, however, it is not so rigidly enforced as to render the program inflexible.

b. Paragraph 2 - Operations: The Artillery and Guided Missile School is aware of the requirement for a practical firing chart which is capable of providing maximum range for 6400 mms, for various types of artillery weapons. Increased emphasis by the Artillery and Guided Missile School should be placed upon devising practical and economical charts for this purpose.

c. Paragraph 3 - Logistics: Non-concur. Ammunition for 105mm artillery units is allocated to I FFORCEV Artillery on an average of 21 rounds per tube, per day, for units assigned missions of general support and reinforcing. This allocation can be increased by the next higher headquarters when the mission of the unit is changed to direct support, or should a tactical emergency arise.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
nc

  
HARNEY G. SILVUS  
CAPTAIN, AGC  
1st AG

<sup>16</sup>  
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AVHGC-DST (30 Apr 67) 4th Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters, 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning rotational humps, page 7; paragraph 2a, 3d Indorsement and Part II, paragraph 1, page 12: Concur with the Commander's comments in Section II, Part I, paragraph 1d regarding the reduction of rotational humps. Actions outlined are appropriate and in consonance with existing regulations.

b. Reference item concerning ASR for 105mm howitzer in GS role, page 9; paragraph 2c, 3d Indorsement; paragraph 2c, 2d Indorsement and paragraph 3, page 12: Concur with 2d and 3d Indorsement comments. USAFV allocates 105mm ammunition to major commanders who in turn sub-allocate to units based upon estimated requirements. The major tactical commander controls the allocations within his command based upon tube density, unit roles, and missions.

c. Reference item concerning WABTOC, paragraph 3a page 10 and paragraph 2a, 2d Indorsement: Concur with 2d Indorsement comments, however, units should bring assets which are made available to them in CONUS to minimize or preclude taxing the in-country supply system stockage capability.

d. Reference item concerning TA 50-901, page 11 and paragraph 2b, 2d Indorsement: Concur with 2d Indorsement comments. This command has only recently reached the "get well" stage on the overall supply of such TA 50-901 items as jungle fatigues and DMS boots. High attrition and rotation humps have resulted in rapid drawdowns on these items and created critical shortages. Those problems have been recognized and are being corrected with a view towards ensuring a more responsive reaction time on resupply of TA 50-901 items.

e. Reference item concerning MWO for the AN/GRC 46, page 11: Concur. Since AN/GRC 46 components are included in the Closed Loop

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AVHGC-DST (30 Apr 67)

4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

program, it is expected that this problem will be minimized in the future.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "J. Gandy", is written over the typed name "J. Gandy".

1 Incl  
nc

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GPOP-DT(30 Apr 67)

5th Ind


SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967  
from HQ, 7th Bn, 13th Arty (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 31 AUG 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed subject report and concurs with the report as indorsed.
2. During the time period that WABTOC packages referred to in subject report were developed and shipped, 10 KW/60 Cycle generators were in critical worldwide short supply. Currently, the supply position on the 10 KW generator for Vietnam is considered adequate to meet using unit requirements. This end item is included in Closed Loop Support (CLS) and the USARV CLS program developed for the 10 KW generator indicates using unit requirements for military standard generator was achieved in June 1967, with total requirements, including maintenance float and depot stocks, to be met in October 1967.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



G. L. McMULLIN  
MAJ. AGC  
Asst AG

1 Incl  
nc

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HEADQUARTERS  
7TH BATTALION 13TH ARTILLERY  
APO 96238

REGULATION  
NUMBER 1-1

4 April 1967

## ADMINISTRATION

### IN-PROCESSING OF FIRING BATTERIES

1. PURPOSE: To establish procedures for in-processing firing batteries upon return to base camp during short periods of refit and maintenance.

2. GENERAL: Periodically commensurate with the battalion's mission, firing batteries will be brought into base camp for a complete inspection, refitting and maintenance program. The length of stay in base camp will rarely exceed 72 hours.

3. CONCEPT: Each of the following staff sections will be responsible for processing the firing battery in the areas indicated.

a. S1

(1) Changes to Emergency Data Cards.

(2) Pay and allowances

(a) Complaints

(b) Increase, start, and stop allotments.

(c) Adjustment of pay drawn across the board.

(3) Personnel Actions

(a) Hardship discharges.

(b) Transfers

(c) Reenlistments and extensions

(4) Personal complaints to Bn CO.

(5) Form 20's and 66's audited.

b. S4

(1) 100% inventory of TOE property

(2) Show down inspection of all items of organizational clothing and equipment recorded on DA Form 10-102.

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Incl 1

REGULATION  
NUMBER 1-1

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

4 April 1967.

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- (3) Shortage processed in accordance with AR 735-11.
- (4) Exchange of unserviceable items.
- (5) Issue of TA50 to personnel shorted on initial issue.

c. Communications

- (1) Operational check of vehicles mtn'd radios.
- (2) Serviceability inspection of TA 312's and SB 22's.
- (3) Accounting and posting check of SOI's.

d. Medical Section


- (1) 100% check of shot records.
- (2) Administering of necessary shots.

e. Battalion Maintenance

- (1) Vehicles are administratively deadlined upon arrival.
- (2) Vehicles will be washed.
- (3) Vehicles will be divided among battalion base camp maintenances shops according to schedule established by Bn Motor Officer, with driver, asst driver and logbook. Trailer will accompany assigned vehicles.
- (4) Vehicles will be lubricated, 1st echelon deficiencies corrected and 2d echelon deficiencies corrected or parts requisitioned.
- (5) Final TI accomplished by bn maintenance personnel.

f. Battalion executive officer will function as overall coordinator.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
A.M. TAKETA  
WO1, USA  
Asst Adj

DISTRIBUTION:

2ea Btry  
2ea Staff Section  
1ea I FFORCEV Arty (FWD)  
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